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Improving Amendment
Jonathan L. Marshfield1. INTRODUCTION
State constitutional amendment rules are often
criticized for their poor design.1 The most common criticism
is that the frequent use of direct democracy bypasses the
virtues of representative decision making and effectively
surrenders constitutional politics to well-financed special
interests. 2 There is much evidence to support this view.
Research suggests that citizens usually give little thought to
how they vote on initiatives, rely on only one source of
information, and rarely discuss ballot initiates with more
than one person. 3 Consequently, citizen-initiative amendments are often ill-considered, poorly vetted, and even
discriminatory. 4 The initiative has also been "industrialized"
in many states.5 Professional signature-gathering firms
exert significant influence on the ballot agenda, and special. Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. I am grateful to Taylor
Bish for helpful research assistance in preparing this essay.
1. See Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of
Deliberation:A Dilemma in State ConstitutionalReform, 68 TEMp. L. REV. 1291, 1291-92
(1995).
2. Eighteen states permit citizens to amend the state constitution by using the
citizen initiative. See John Dinan, State ConstitutionalDevelopments in 2014, in 47 THE
BOOK OF THE STATES: 2015 EDITION 3, 3 (2015). For a helpful summary of the many
criticisms of the citizen initiative to amend state constitutions, see Cody Hoesly,
Comment, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1191,
1202-12 (2005).
3. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1301 (summarizing empirical research
regarding voter decision-making on ballot measures).
4. See id. at 1301-02 (describing shortcomings of the initiative process); Hoesly,
supra note 2, at 1209-12 (describing "discriminatory capture" of constitutional
initiative).
5. See Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1202 (describing how the initiative process has
been commoditized by private initiative firms that exert significant influence in the
process).
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interest firms often spend significant money on mass-media
campaigns that affect referenda outcomes. 6 Thus, to the
extent constitutional amendment should involve a more
deliberate and inclusive democratic process, the initiative
seems to be performing poorly in many states.7
One solution might be to give the legislature greater
control over the amendment process. 8 But this approach
comes with its own costs. Because of self interest in
retaining the political status quo, state legislators often
resist popular constitutional reform on important issues
such as legislative term limits, redistricting, and campaign
finance. 9 In addition to these troubling agency costs, citizens
have very few opportunities for meaningful participation
and deliberation when the legislature controls the
amendment process. Although legislatures submit proposed
amendments to a public vote,' 0 referenda are often
ineffective at fostering meaningful citizen deliberation and
participation. In fact, voters often skip referenda questions

&

6. Reid Wilson, Initiative Spending Booms Past$1 Billion as CorporationsSponsor
Their Own Proposals, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpostcom/b
logs/govbeat/wp/2013/11/08/initiative-spending-booms-past-1-billion-ascorporations-sponsor-their-own-proposals/ [https://perma.cc/7U96-98G6] (stating
that corporations spent "more than $1 billion" on ballot initiatives in eleven states
between 2012-2013).
7. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1302 ("[I]nitiatives are much less
successful in producing deliberate, comprehensive, and representative change.")
(emphasis omitted); see also DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 198-99 (1984) (concluding that initiatives are
dominated by special-interest groups).
8. See Eric Lane, Men are not Angels: The Realpolitik of Direct Democracy and
What We Can do About It, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 579, 580-81 (1998) (arguing that
direct democracy in any form should be opposed in states in favor of representative
lawmaking processes).
9. See, e.g., Anne G. Campbell, Direct Democracy and Constitutional Reform:
Campaign Finance Initiatives in Colorado, in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 175, 191-92 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (explaining
that Colorado General Assembly stalled campaign finance reform); see also Gais
Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1298 ("Legislatures resist fundamental revisions because
many of the demands for reform are in fact aimed at state legislatures and threaten
the interests of their members.") (emphasis omitted); Heather K. Gerken, Getting
From Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1-2
(2010) (noting that political reform regarding state districting is unlikely to come
from state legislatures because "foxes are guarding the henhouse").
10. This is true for all states except Delaware, which allows the legislature to
adopt amendments without a public referendum. See Dinan, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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entirely," and research on voter turnout suggests that
candidate elections, rather than ballot issues, truly drive
voter turnout.12

It seems, therefore, that many states need to improve
the democratic quality of their amendment procedures.
States need effective ways to foster constructive public
deliberation, incentivize meaningful citizen participation,
and provide checks on the influence of special interests.1 3 In
this essay, I consider whether states might achieve some of
those improvements if they changed the process for ratifying
citizen-initiative amendments to require debate and
approval by locally elected governing bodies rather than a
public referendum. 14
Sending amendment ratification
decisions to locally elected bodies could have the beneficial
effect of keeping constitutional decision-making close to
citizens while at the same time retaining many of the virtues
associated with representative decision-making. It might
also help undermine special-interest capture by dividing
amendment power across numerous independently elected
bodies rather than centralizing it within a state legislature or
popular majority vote.
To explore the costs and benefits of this proposal, I
focus my analysis on the sixteen states that currently allow

11. See Martin P. Wattenberg et al., How Voting Is Like Taking an SAT Test: An
Analysis of American Voter Rolloff 28 AM. POL. Q. 234, 247-48 (2000) (explaining that
voters tend to skip many ballot questions); see also MAGLEBY, supra note 7, at 105.
12. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1302.
13. Id. at 1303 ("What we need... are constitutional revision procedures that
are deliberative as well as legitimate-procedures that command legitimacy by
providing for direct citizen participation and control, but that also generate and
assess alternative proposals, take into account the best available information about
their likely effects, consider the interactions between the proposed changes and the
rest of the constitutional structure, and afford opportunities for discussion and
accommodation among significant political interests.").
14. Although Congress has required new states to include a referendum as part
of their amendment processes, there is no legal requirement that admitted states
retain the referendum. Indeed, Delaware's current amendment rules allow the
legislature to amend the constitution without a referendum, and several states have
utilized amendment procedures in the past that did not require a referendum. Jennie
Drage Bowser, Constitutions:Amend with Care, ST. LEGISLATURES, Sept. 2015, at 16,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/constitution-amend-withcare.aspx [https://perma.cc/ KBM9-T9RL].

480

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:477

for constitutional amendment by both legislative referral
(where the legislature proposes amendments to be ratified
by a referendum) and citizen-initiative (where citizens can
bypass the legislature and propose amendments to be
ratified by a referendum).1 5 The specific proposal that I
explore is whether those sixteen states could improve their
amendment processes by changing amendment rules to
require ratification of citizen-initiatives by some majority of
existing county governing bodies rather than a statewide
referendum. 16
I conclude that a "county-ratification" model has the
potential to improve amendment processes in at least three
ways.
First, it could improve the quality of citizen
participation by reducing the size of the jurisdiction where
amendment decisions are debated and decided.17 Second, it
could increase the quality of public deliberation regarding
constitutional change by taking amendment decisions from
the secrecy and isolation of the voting booth and placing
them in the proverbial "town square" where locally elected
officials must publicly justify and debate their decision.' 8 A
county-ratification model might also increase the quality of
public deliberation by ensuring that minority communities
have a voice in the process.' 9 Third, a county-ratification
15. States allowing the citizen initiative include: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. See Dinan, supra note 2, at 15
(listing state amendment processes). Although Illinois and Massachusetts also allow
for amendment by initiative, I do not include them in my analysis because both states
place significant limitations on the citizen initiative. Illinois allows citizen-initiative
amendments regarding changes to only the legislative article of the Illinois
constitution. See ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Massachusetts has an "indirect initiative"
process, whereby the legislature must approve all citizen initiatives before they can
be placed on the ballot See MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. 4, § 5. Massachusetts also
allows a supermajority of the legislature to amend initiative proposals. See MASS.
CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. 4 § 3. Because of these limitations, the initiative is an infrequent
method of constitutional change in both states. Indeed, neither state has adopted an
amendment by initiative in the last decade.
16. As explained in more detail below, all sixteen states already have
functioning county governing bodies that could take up proposed amendments. See
infra text accompanying note 167.
17. See infra Section IV.C.1.
18. See infra Section IV.C.2.
19. Id.
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model might limit the influence of special interests by
dividing the amendment power between multiple county
governing bodies that have incentives to monitor each other
and are generally more responsive and accountable to local
constituencies. 20
Of course, the county-ratification model is not a
panacea. There are many difficulties and costs associated
with this approach. It might, for example, make the citizeninitiative too difficult to use, which would effectively shift all
amendment power to the legislature. 21
County
representatives might also be ill-suited to decide statewide
constitutional issues because of mismatched expertise and
limited resources. 22 A county-ratification model could also
result in unconstitutional voter dilution because of
significant population differences between counties. 23 These
issues, among others, represent serious difficulties with the
county-ratification model that cannot be overlooked. My
goal in this essay is only to suggest that the countyratification model deserves serious consideration as states
struggle with how they might improve their amendment
processes.
Part II provides a brief summary of state constitutional
amendment rules and practices with an emphasis on the
states' tradition of assessing and redesigning amendment
rules from time-to-time.
Part III explores the major
problems with the two dominant amendment methods: the
legislative-referral and citizen-initiative methods. Part IV
presents my county-ratification model and argues that it has
the potential to improve the democratic quality of state
amendment practices. Part V addresses some important
difficulties and likely costs associated with the countyratification model.

20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Section IV.C.3.
See infra Section V.B.
Id.
See infra Section V.A.
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II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT METHODS
AND DESIGN
Because Article V of the United States Constitution has
remained unchanged since 1788 and seems immune to
redesign, it is easy to overlook the states' long tradition of
experimenting with amendment procedures. 24 This Part
provides a very general overview of the dominant
amendment methods that the states have considered and
developed over time. As others have noted, "no catalogue of
the mechanisms for state constitutional change can fully
capture the richness or the variety of the approaches that
have been used." 25 Thus, the purpose of this Part is not to
chronicle all developments in state amendment design, but
only to demonstrate that the states have a strong tradition of
reevaluating and redesigning their amendment procedures.
This Part also provides an original tabulation of recent
amendment-rate data, which suggest that despite variety in
amendment processes, the vast majority of state
amendments occur through two processes: (1) legislative
proposals ratified by referenda, and (2) citizen initiatives
ratified by referenda.
A. The State Tradition of Redesigning Amendment

Processes
The whole idea of incremental constitutional change
through
textual
amendment
originated
in
state
26
constitutions.
Following John Locke's 1669 Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolina, which famously declared that
24.

See generally JOHN

J. DINAN,

THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION

29-63 (2006) (describing the many revisions to state amendment procedures over
time).
25. G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Getting from Here to There: Twenty-First
Century Mechanisms and Opportunitiesin State ConstitutionalReform, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
1075, 1077 (2005).
26. See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 136-

42 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980) (discussing how early state
constitutional theory broke from thinking of the time regarding supremacy and
inalterability of constitutional law); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 614 (1969).
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shall...

remain...

unalterable," 27 the states began to recognize the need for an
ordered process of constitutional change. 28
As the states began to experiment with how best to
design an amendment process, they were generally weary of
amendment procedures that empowered the legislature or
other representatives to amend the constitution without
direct popular involvement. 29 Only three of the twenty-six
state constitutions adopted before 1800 authorized the
legislature to amend the constitution.30
The dominant early approach to amendment was to
require a popularly elected constitutional convention for all
amendments. 3 ' Those conventions were elected separately
from the legislature and convened to consider specific,
predetermined issues.32
This "convention model" of
amendment was intended to preserve popular sovereignty
by ensuring that elected representatives could not abuse the
amendment power.33
Generally, conventions were
authorized to adopt amendments without any further
ratification or a popular referendum. 34 The deliberation and

27.

Sanford

Levinson,

Introduction: Imperfection

and Amendability,

in

RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

-

3, 4 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (quoting and discussing the 1669 Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolina).
28. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 70-75 (1998)
(discussing development of early state amendment procedures). Six of the original
sixteen state constitutions did not contain any rules for amendment or revision. See
id. at 62-63 (listing early states without amendment rules).
29. See ADAMS, supra note 26, at 142 ("The point at issue clearly was the
relationship between the sovereign people and their elected rulers.").
30. See TARR, supra note 28, at 61, 73-74 (summarizing development of early
state amendment procedures).
31. See DINAN, supra note 24, at 41; TARR, supra note 28, at 73-74.
32. See WALTER FAIRLEIGH
CONSTITUTIONS 28-29 (1910).

DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT

OF STATE

33. See TARR, supra note 28, at 70-71.
34. Id. The 1784 New Hampshire constitution was the first to adopt a
referendum requirement stating that all amendments adopted by the convention
must be approved by a majority of the "qualified voters." DODD, supra note 32; James
A. Henretta, Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 826-31
(1991) (noting "[o]nly two of the twenty-eight state constitutions adopted before
1800... were sent to the people for ratification," and that amendment rules "placed
control of that process in the hands of the legislature").
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approval of a convention was considered sufficient
democratic process to legitimate amendments. 35
By the mid-1800s, most states recognized that the
convention process was too inflexible. 36 Rapidly changing
circumstances put pressure on state constitutional texts to
change, and the convention model was too cumbersome and
rigid to accommodate those needs.37 Thus, states began to
debate alternative designs for the amendment power.38 The
dominant design concern during this period was to make
amendment easier and more responsive to changing
circumstances while retaining appropriate constitutional
stability.3 9

The states experimented with a variety of approaches
that authorized legislatures to adopt amendments. 40 Some
states, for example, authorized the legislature to adopt
amendments with a supermajority in two successive
legislative sessions. 41 This design was intended to facilitate
deliberation within the legislature and ensure public
accountability with an intervening legislative election. 42
Other states required amendments to be separately
approved by supermajorities in both houses and submitted
to a public referendum. 43 As states debated and deployed
these varying designs, the dominant approach that emerged
was to require supermajority approval by the legislature,
followed by a popular referendum. 44
The next major development in state amendment
design was the product of the Progressive movement of the
early twentieth century. 45 As a result of state legislatures

35. TARR, supra note 28, at 70.
36. DINAN, supra note 24, at 32-37, 41.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 41-47.
39. Id. at 42-44; DODD, supra note 32, at 120.
40. DINAN, supra note 24, at 43-44; see also DODD, supra note 32, at 118-20
(recounting the origins of legislative amendments).
41. DINAN, supra note 24, at 43.
42. Id.; DODD, supra note 32, at 122.
43. DINAN, supra note 24, at 43.
44. Id. at 44-45.
45. Id. at 47-48.

2016]

IMPROVING AMENDMENT

485

and judges blocking popular Progressive social reform
legislation, there was a growing populist movement to
further "liberalize" amendment procedures. 46 The most
significant design change during this period was the
adoption of the constitutional-initiative as an entirely new
mechanism for amendment. 47 The general structure of the
constitutional-initiative was to allow citizens to propose and
ratify constitutional amendments without any involvement
by the legislature. 48 The initiative was intended to address
concerns regarding special-interest capture in state
legislatures and facilitate greater citizen participation in
constitutional politics. 4 9 Oregon was the first state to adopt

the constitutional-initiative in 1902, followed by seventeen
other states by the end of the twentieth century.s0
The modern constitutional commission is a further
development (or perhaps refinement) in state amendment
design.51 In general, commissions are independent bodies
that provide recommendations for constitutional change to
the legislature, a constitutional convention, or the people
directly. 52 Commissions are generally established to provide
expert consideration of constitutional reform, but they do
not have a mandate to adopt constitutional changes on their
own.53
Florida's Constitutional Revision Commission,
constitu- tionalized in 1968, is the one exception to this
structure. 54
The Florida Commission is convened

46. Id. at 47-50.
47. Id. at 59.
48. DINAN, supra note 24, at 59.
49. Id. at 59-60.
50. Id. at 62, 313 n.132 (listing the eighteen states and dates of adoption).
51. See generally Tarr & Williams, supra note 25, at 1094-1100 (describing the
various forms of constitutional commissions).
52. See Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the
Past? The Increasing Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional
Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 1, 4 (1996).
53. Id. at 5. Commission members are usually appointed rather than elected,
but appointees can be already-elected officials, citizens, experts, stakeholders, or any
combination of these. Id. at 2 (characterizing state constitutional commissions as
"appointed").
54. See generally Tarr & Williams, supra note 25, at 1097-99 (describing the
Florida commission process).
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automatically every twenty years, and its recommendations
are automatically placed on the ballot for ratification by
referendum.5 5 Florida's variation on the constitutional
commission is significant from the perspective of
constitutional design because it was intended to operate as a
check on legislative capture and to allow an independent
body to propose necessary amendments directly to
citizens. 56
Current state amendment procedures represent
variations on and combinations of these core components.
Forty-nine states currently permit amendments by
legislative approval, followed by a public referendum for
Eighteen of those states also permit
ratification.5 7
amendments by constitutional-initiative, although some of
those states limit the use of the initiative to certain
subjects.58 Delaware is somewhat unique in that it does not
allow for amendment by public initiative and is the only
state that permits amendment by the legislature without a
ratifying referendum. 59 At least three states still allow for
amendments to be made by calling a limited constitutional
convention to consider specific reforms. 60 And, as noted
above, Florida's amendment rules require a constitutional
commission to be formed every twenty years and authorizes
the commission to put proposed amendments directly to a
referendum.61

A few states have experimented with integrating the
constitutional-initiative and legislative-referral methods of
amendment. Massachusetts, for example, requires that all
55. Id. at 1097.
56. Id. at 1098 n.122.
57. See Dinan, supra note 2, at 13 tbl.1.2.
58. See id. at 15 tbl.1.3; see also, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVII, § 2 (excluding
certain subjects from amendment by initiative).
59. See id at 13-15 tbls.1.2 & 1.3. The Delaware Legislature must approve
amendments by two-thirds majorities in two successive legislative sessions. Id at 13
tbl.1.2.
60. See Tarr & Williams, supra note 25, at 1086 (discussing Kansas, North
Carolina, and Tennessee).
61. Id. at 1097. Rhode Island has a hybrid approach that requires a periodic
commission to consider presenting specific constitutional questions to the electorate
and whether the electorate should call a constitutional convention. Id. at 1099-1100.
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constitutional initiatives be approved by one-fourth of the
legislature sitting jointly in two successive legislative
sessions. 62 Similarly, Mississippi allows the legislature to
submit an amended or alternative proposal to voters
alongside any initiative proposals. 63 These refinements on
the amendment process seem designed to provide a check
on direct democracy by subjecting the initiative to review by
elected representatives.
In sum, the states have a tradition of revising and
experimenting with amendment processes. It is important,
therefore, that scholars assess existing amendment
processes and provide useful guidance as to how
amendment processes might be improved in the future.
B. Contemporary State Practice of Formal Amendment
Despite the various amendment methods available
under state constitutions, 64 data regarding the actual use of
amendment
procedures
are
helpful
in
focusing
recommendations for design reform.
Two points are
particularly important for present purposes: (1) states
amend their constitutions relatively frequently on a variety
of important issues, and (2) despite the various state
amendment processes, 99.5% of amendments in the last
decade occurred through either the legislative-referral or
the citizen-initiative method, 65 making these two approaches
the dominant methods of state constitutional change.

62. See Dinan, supra note 2, at 15 tbl.1.3. Massachusetts also limited the use of
the initiative by excluding certain subjects from amendment by initiative. MASS.
CONST. art. XLVII, § 2.
63. Dinan, supra note 2, at 15 tbl.1.3. Illinois limits the use of the initiative to
only amendments regarding the structure of the legislative branch. Id
64. See Teresa Stanton Collett, judicial Independence and Accountability in an
Age of Unconstitutional ConstitutionalAmendments, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 334-35
(2010) (noting there are currently four dominant methods of amendment: "(1) voter
adoption of legislatively-referred proposals, (2) voter adoption of citizen-initiated
proposals, (3) voter adoption of commission-referred proposals, or (4) through
constitutional conventions") (footnotes omitted).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
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First, as many others have noted, state constitutional
amendment has become very frequent in most states.66
Although there is great variety, states revise their
constitutions every three years on average. 67 Additionally,
those amendments touch on a variety of important
structural and rights issues. 68 Amendment practice is thus a
significant aspect of constitutional practice in the states.
Unlike the United States Constitution, where constitutional
change occurs primarily through judicial review of an
infrequently amended text, state constitutional change is
much more institutionally interactive, with democratic
institutions playing a significant role in the development of
It is therefore important that
constitutional rules. 6 9
amendment processes be critically examined and refined
when necessary.
Another important observation from state amendment
data relates to the relative use of the various methods of
amendment. Although the states have experimented with a
variety of different amendment approaches, amendments
seem to occur primarily through legislative referral to
referenda or citizen initiatives. 70 There have been a few
amendments by the convention or commission methods, but
just over 91% of the 575 state constitutional amendments
adopted over the last decade occurred through the

66. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1672-75 (2014).
67. Id. at 1674.
68. There were 603 proposed amendments to state constitutions (excluding
local amendments) between 2002 and 2008. See John Dinan, State Constitutional
Developments in 2008, in 41 THE BOOK OF THE STATES: 2009 EDITION 3, 6 tbl.B (2009);
John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2007, in 40 THE BOOK OF THE STATES:
2008 EDITION 3, 5 tbl.B (2008). Of these, 242 related to issues of government
structure, and 110 related to rights issues. This means that more than fifty-eight
percent of all proposed amendments to during this period concerned issues of
government structure or rights. Of the proposed amendments that were actually
adopted, an even higher percentage related to structural or rights issues.
69. Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in Constitutional Amendment, 69
ARK. L. REV. 217 (2016).
70. TARR, supra note 28, at 139; Dinan, supra note 2, at 4 tbl.A.
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method.71
referendum
and
referral
legislative
Approximately 7.5% of amendments in the last decade
occurred through citizen initiatives, 72 and less than 1%
occurred through commissions.73
The data are interesting on a state-by-state level for
states with at least two methods of amendment.7 4 The chart
below illustrates the relative use of the methods of
amendment in these states.75

State Amendments by Method
of Amendment 2005-2014
25
20
15

00

E Legislative

U Initiative

Commission

71. This percentage is calculated based on my original tabulation of amendment
data as reported in the annual Book of the States from 2005-2015. Of the 575
amendments adopted, 527 of them were through the legislative-referral method.
72. Forty-five of the 575 amendments were adopted through the initiative
process.
73. Only three of the 575 amendments were adopted through the commission
process.
74. I did not include Illinois or Massachusetts in this chart because of the
significant limitations on the initiative discussed. Supra note 15.
75. These data are from my tabulation of amendment data from the Book of the
States. See supra note 71 (explaining data tabulation). All tabulations are on file with
the author and are available upon request.
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As the data show, the legislative-referral method
remains relevant even in states where citizens are active in
using the initiative. In California, for example, thirty-eight
percent of all amendments over the last decade were
initiated by the legislature.76 Oklahoma is also interesting
because it has adopted the most amendments in the last
decade of any of these states (twenty-five amendments), but
all of those amendments were by legislative referral."7
Finally, it is interesting to note that the average amendment
rate between states with the initiative and states without the
initiative is very similar. The average amendment rate for
states without the initiative is 11.5 amendments over the
last ten years.78 For states with both the initiative and the
legislative-referral process, the average amendment rate is
11.3.79 Thus, it appears the contemporary amendment
practice in the states is dominated by these two methods. It
is now appropriate to consider existing criticisms of these
methods and how they might be improved.
Ill. PREVAILING CRITICISMS OF STATE AMENDMENT
METHODS
This Part provides a brief summary of the prevailing
criticisms of the two dominant methods of state
constitutional amendment: the legislative referral and the
citizen initiative.
A. Criticisms of the Legislative-Referral Method
As noted above, the legislative-referral method is the
dominant method of amendment in most states. Each state
has its own important history with adopting and
76. This percentage is calculated based on my original tabulation of amendment
data as reported in the annual Book of the States from 2005-2015.
77. This percentage is calculated based on my original tabulation of amendment
data as reported in the annual Book of the States from 2005-2015.
78. This includes Massachusetts and Illinois. The average amendment rate is
simply the total number of amendments between 2004 and 2015, divided by the total
number of states.
79. In the past decade, there were only three amendments adopted based on a
commission's referral. Those were in Florida in 2008.
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implementing this approach, but the legislative-referral
method is generally intended to ensure that proposed
amendments are deliberated by representatives with
incentives to "foster compromise, continuity, and
consensus" 80 before submitting vetted proposals to a
popular vote. Notwithstanding its dominance in current
state constitutional amendment practice, there are real
method of
problems with the legislative-referral
amendment. This Section briefly describes the method's
general shortcomings.
1. Legislative Self-Interest As Undermining Democratic
Process
The legislative-referral method gives state legislators
the power to initiate amendments as representatives of the
people.81 In this capacity, legislators are expected to act in
the interests of their constituents and the polity as whole
rather than their own self-interest. 82 However, many
constitutional reforms create a significant conflict between
legislator- and constituent-interests that can undermine the
democratic quality of the legislative-referral method.83
This is primarily because elected legislators have a
vested personal interest in retaining the political status quo
that resulted in their election. 84 Constitutional amendments
related to issues such as redistricting, campaign finance,
legislative term limits, and voter registration and
identification often create an incongruence between popular
collective preferences and representative decision making.85
80. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 43 (1995).
81. See Matthew Robinson, Note, Deferring to Congressional Interpretationsof
Ambiguous Statutory Provisions,16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 565, 569 (2013).
82. See id at 590.
83. Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1298; see also Gerken, supra note 9.
84. See Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

&

REFORM 177, 178 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006); see also Gais
Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1298; Gerken, supra note 9, at 1-2.
85. See Campbell, supra note 9, at 176, 179-93 (discussing the legislature's
conflict of interest regarding campaign-finance reform); Gerken, supra note 9 (same
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This can result in representatives using the amendment
power to serve their own interests by introducing
amendments that would preserve the political status quo or
resisting amendments that would change the status quo.8 6
Thus, a major issue surrounding the legislativereferral method is the legislature's ability to misuse the
amendment power in ways that further the self-interest of
individual legislators or political parties and fail to respect
the people's preferences. Improving the democratic quality
of the amendment process would suggest the need for a
more direct method of amendment that is not entirely
dependent on the legislature.
2. Capture and Agency Costs As Undermining Popular
Sovereignty
A related problem with the legislative-referral
method is its vulnerability to "capture" by special interests.
Capture occurs when groups or people with a personal
interest in lawmaking gain a disproportionate influence in

regarding redistricting reform); David Orentlicher, Conflicts of Interest and the
Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713, 763-64 (2002) (same regarding legislative
term limits); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular
Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 I.L. & POL. 331,
331-32 (2007) (same regarding redistricting); Mark Thomas Quinlivan, Comment,
One Person, One Vote Revisited: The Impending Necessity ofJudicial Intervention in the
Realm of Voter Registration, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2361, 2386 (1989) (same regarding
voter-registration laws). Voter-identification laws are an interesting example of this
phenomenon because they can present a clear conflict of interest between citizens
and representatives, but recently they have involved action (rather than inaction) by
state legislatures to preserve the status quo. See Bob von Sternberg & Rachel E.
Stassen-Berger, GOP ProposingAmendments to Avert Possible Veto on Legislation, STAR
TRIBUNE (Apr. 27, 2011, 11:05 PM), http://www.startribune.com/gop-proposingamendments-to-avert-possible-veto-on-legislation/120831589/ [https://perma.cc/6
PQA-DHCL] (discussing a proposed Minnesota amendment to require voter
identification as a way to entrench Republican political power). Interestingly, the
amendment was placed on the ballot in Minnesota, but rejected by voters. Martin
Moylan et al., Voter ID amendment defeated, MPR NEWS (Nov. 7, 2012, 1:46 AM),
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2012/11/06/politics/voter-id-amendment [https:/
/perma.cc/QG7G-GY5L].
86. Gerken, supra note 9.
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the lawmaking process. 8 7 When this occurs, the lawmaking

process is used in a manner that benefits a small group of
interested stakeholders and is incongruent with popular
political preferences.8 8
Unfortunately, state legislatures have a history of
being captured (or "corrupted") by special interests from
time to time.89
If the legislature also controls the
amendment power through the legislative-referral method,
special interests can entrench favorable policies in the state
constitution even though the public does not support them. 90
Additionally, if special interests control the legislature, the
people have limited means of taking back control of their
constitution.9 1 Thus, from a design perspective, if the
amendment power is to provide a check on elected
representatives, it must be available to the public in a more
direct manner than that provided by the legislative-referral
method. 92
3. Limited Citizen Deliberation or Involvement
A further limitation on the legislative-referral method
is that it provides very few opportunities for meaningful

87. See Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail:
Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IowA L. REV. 569, 632 (1998)
(providing a general definition of government capture).
88. Id. at 584-85.
89. TARR, supra note 28, at 110-13 (describing historical corruption of state
legislatures by special interest); see also State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, 498 (1870)
(claiming that there was a "most vicious and corrupt system which prevailed in our
legislative bodies"). The influence of special interests on state legislatures persists
today. See Editorial Board, Post's Endorsement: Vote No on Ballot Question 1 in Va.,
WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/postsendorsement-vote-no-on-ballot-question-1-in-va/2012/11/01/62636726-lc8e11e2-ba31-3083ca97c314_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6VCK-PRGV]
(describing
eminent-domain amendment to Virginia constitution that was the product of
legislators "in thrall to special interests").
90. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1298, 1314.
91. See Ora Fred Harris, Jr., Complex ProductDesign Litigation:A Need for More
Capable Fact-Finders, 79 KY. L.J. 477, 486 n.52 (1991) ("Because of political
compromising with and influence peddling by special interest groups, the state
constitutional amendment process is particularly vulnerable to dilution.").
92. See DINAN supra note 24, at 47-51, 53 (describing this debate in various
state constitutional conventions).
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citizen involvement in the amendment process. 9 3

The

legislative-referral method permits citizen involvement only
at the ratification stage, and then only by casting an "up-ordown" vote on the legislature's proposal. 94 Because of the
size and geographical dispersity of state populations, most
citizens find state government too remote for them to get
involved in "thick" forms of citizen participation, such as
attending legislative debates and contacting state
representatives regarding proposed amendments.9 5
Additionally, even "thin" forms of participation, like
voting on amendment referenda, seem very poor methods
for fostering citizen involvement and participation.
Empirical research into voter choice suggests that citizens
are generally more attentive to candidate elections at the
state level than ballot questions, and that many voters skip
ballot questions altogether. 96
Thus, the legislative-referral method appears to
provide few opportunities for direct citizen involvement and
deliberation regarding proposed constitutional changes.
B. Criticisms of the Citizen-Initiative Method
The citizen-initiative method of state constitutional
amendment is a relatively recent innovation. As noted
above, Oregon was the first state to adopt the constitutionalinitiative process in 1902.97 There are now eighteen states
93. See id. at 52 (discussing need for greater citizen involvement in amendment
process).
94. See Tarr & Williams, supra note 25, at 1092-94 (describing legislative
referral method of amendment).
95. I have argued elsewhere that citizens are more likely to engage in this type
of political activity at the state level than at the federal level. See Jonathan L.
Marshfield, Models of Subnational Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REv. 1151, 118788 (2011). However, empirical research suggests that even within state jurisdictions,
most citizens are unlikely to participate in this way when jurisdictions have more
than 1 million people. See J. ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 42 (2001) (finding
that only twenty-five percent of citizens in cities of one million people or more contact
local representatives).
96. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 7, at 77-99 (comparing voter turnout in
ballot-question-only elections to candidate elections); Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1,
at 1302 (summarizing empirical research regarding voter decision-making on ballot
measures).
97. Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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that permit citizens to amend their constitutions to some
degree through this method.98 Although each state has its
own history in adopting the constitutional initiative, states
generally adopted the initiative as a mechanism for restoring
popular sovereignty to constitutional law.99 However, after
more than a century of use in several states, significant
problems have developed in the use of the citizen-initiative
method.
1. Circumventing Deliberation and Lawmaking Expertise
Perhaps the most common and persistent criticism of
the citizen-initiative method of state constitutional
amendment is that it circumvents constructive political
deliberation regarding fundamental political issues. This
critique echoes Madison's famous argument in favor of
representative decision making.1 00 Madison argued that
direct democracy can result in near-sighted decision making
void of administrative expertise and lacking relevant
information.101 Madison also feared that direct democracy
was more likely to be misused by interest groups in
furtherance of goals that were not in the best interest of
society as a whole.1 02 For Madison, representative decision
making was preferable because it involved informed debate
by professional lawmakers who were best situated to
evaluate a proposal's broad impact on society as a whole.10 3
From a design perspective, this process can be
fostered by submitting proposals to an open deliberation by
elected representatives. As Hans Linde noted, "Deliberation
in representative bodies does not often achieve its ideal of
98. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing these states and
limitations on initiative).
99. See DINAN supra note 24, at 60 (discussing historical reasons for adoption of
the initiative); Magleby, supra note 80 (stating the initiative was a check on state
legislatures and courts and served to promote "widespread participation, open access
to the political agenda, and political equality").
100. See THE FEDERALISTNO. 10 (James Madison).
101. Id.
102. Id.; see Hans A. Linde, When Is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican
Government"?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 159, 166 (1989).
103. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 100.

496

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:477

dispassionate debate and logical persuasion, but it does
institutionalize" decision making in a way that facilitates
discussion regarding society's interests as a whole rather
than the particular preferences of individual citizens or
groups.1 04 Representatives are publically accountable to
broad-based constituencies that likely have varied interests.
They also deal repeatedly with fellow representatives
regarding many different issues. Thus, representatives must
evaluate their votes in a broader context. They must identify
and rank public priorities, and make decisions about how
best to allocate limited public resources as a whole. All of
these factors can facilitate a more holistic and informed
decision-making process.
Many commentators have argued that amendment by
initiative circumvents this deliberative process.105 This
method allows any citizen to bypass representative decision
making and place constitutional changes on the ballot simply
by obtaining a set number of signatures from fellow
citizens.1 06 Citizens then vote on the proposal by casting an
independent and private ballot.1 07 Although this process
brings decision making directly to individual citizens, it does
not provide a forum for deliberation between decisionmakers and it assumes that citizens will independently
gather relevant information and obtain the expertise
necessary to decide an issue. 08 The secrecy of the voter
ratification process also makes it susceptible to shortsighted, narrow, and discriminatory choice.
Empirical research into the initiative process
suggests that these criticisms are well founded.1 09 Voter
choice on initiatives seems to be heavily affected by general

104. Linde, supra note 102, at 169.
105. See, e.g., Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1301-02 (describing
shortcomings of initiative process).
106. See M. DANE WATERS, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 2-29 (2003)
(describing initiative process in all initiative states).
107. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
108. Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1292.
109. Id. at 1301-02 ("[R]esearch on citizen initiatives suggest that they hardly
resemble a deliberative process.").
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discontent with bureaucracy and government officials'
perceived inefficiencies rather than the specific merits of a
particular proposal.1 10 This may be in part because voters
succumb to significant information difficulties that impede
critical decision making and constructive deliberation."'
One study found that many initiative voters learn about the
initiative only days before the vote, consult only one source
of information regarding the initiative, and very rarely
discuss the initiative with anyone.11 2 Initiative campaign
material also suggests "little evidence of real learning about
the issues."113
These findings suggest significant problems with the
contemporary constitutional-initiative.
The initiative
process seems generally ineffective at producing informed,
high-quality collective decisions that serve the interests of
society as a whole.
2. Capture by Well-Funded Special Interests
The citizen initiative was initially envisioned as a
populist check on government." 4 Ideally, citizens would
mobilize and use the initiative to correct government
corruption or capture and restore power to the people.
However, a recurring criticism of the contemporary
initiative process is that it is has become more susceptible to
capture by special interest groups than state legislatures.'1s
There is compelling empirical evidence that special
interests often control the initiative process.11 6 A niche
110. Id. at 1301.
111. Id.
112. See id. This means that many initiatives are decided based on off-the-cuff
visceral reactions by voters rather than sustained deliberation between decision
makers.
113. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1302.
114. See Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1193 ("Originally, backers of direct democracy
believed that it would be 'the medicine of the constitution'....") (quoting JAMES D.
BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE REFERENDUM, AND RECALL IN OREGON 78
(1915)).

115. See id. at 1202.
116. A compelling anecdotal example is a recent amendment to the Ohio
constitution that would have legalized marijuana and granted a production monopoly
to any supporter of the initiative that contributed at least $2 million to the campaign.
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industry has developed around the initiative in many
Initiative firms will guarantee the required
states.117
number of signatures for an initiative "on a money back
basis," and promise to collect valid signatures in as little as
forty-five days.' 18 The going rate for a guaranteed ballot
initiative in California, for example, was approximately $1
million in 1998119

Ballot industrialization has resulted in a massive
influx of special-interest financing, making it increasingly
difficult for volunteer-only initiatives to succeed.1 20 Indeed,
between May 2012 and November 2013, corporations spent
more than $1 billion in ballot initiatives in only eleven
states,121 and the number of ballot initiatives using only
citizen volunteers is very small compared to initiatives run
by firms.1 22 In Oregon, for example, ninety-four percent of
initiatives on the ballot between 1996 and 2002 were
handled by paid signature-gathering firms, and eighty
percent of initiatives on the ballot in Washington between
1992 and 2000 were by paid gathering firms.1 23 In the
words of a signature-gathering firm in Washington, "there
isn't a chance in the world a volunteer effort is going to make

See Noah Feldman, Ohio Rejects Pot, but its Constitution Gets Weird, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Nov. 4, 2015, 1:32 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-04/ohiorejects-pot-but-its-constitution-gets-weird [https://perma.cc/9RCB-35SY]. Another
particularly egregious example was Proposal 6 in Michigan regarding the
construction of a new bridge into Canada. See Michigan Proposal 6 Results: Voters
Reject Ballot ProposalRequiring Public Vote on InternationalBridges, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 7, 2012, 1:03 AM), http://www.huffingtonpostcom/2012/11/07/michiganproposal-6-results-bridge-n_2084608.html [https://perma.cc/VB5F-ZMPY]. Proposal
6 would have amended the Michigan constitution to require a public referendum
before the state could spend any money to construct any new international bridges.
Id The proposal was sponsored almost entirely by the owner of the only existing
bridge between Detroit and Canada. Id.
117. See Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1202 (describing this "industrialization" of the
initiative process).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 1202-03.
120. Id.
121. See Wilson, supra note 6.
122. See Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1203.
123. Id; see also Richard J. Ellis, Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process:
How DemocraticIs It?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 35, 53, 55 (2003).
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it."124 Additionally, special interests spend significant capital
successfully opposing volunteer amendments that might
negatively affect them. 125 One study found that this strategy
is particularly effective: "[O]pponents of an initiative win
80% of the time when they outspend proponents."1 26
Consequently, the initiative process is often
dominated by well-funded special interest groups rather
than genuine populist movements.1 27 This has led some
observers to conclude that although the initiative was
intended to foster "grassroots democracy," it has instead
become a haven for "greenback democracy."1 28 Because
"anybody can buy their way on the ballot,"1 29 the initiative
often "[a]llow[s] rich individuals or well-financed special
interests to qualify measures for the ballot almost regardless
of either the depth or intensity of popular support."130
There have been efforts to reform the initiative
process by imposing restrictions on paid signature gatherers
and other requirements for signature gathering.131 These
measures have had some impact, but they have not fully
addressed the problem, and the Supreme Court has limited
the type of restrictions states can place on signature
gathering.1 32 Indeed, most states with the initiative still
allow paid signature gatherers without significant
limitations, and the process still seems too easily dominated
by well-funded interest groups.

124. Ellis, supra note 123, at 54.
125. See Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1204-05.
126. Id. at 1205.
127. See id. at 1202 ("Professional signature gatherers and political strategy
firms have long dominated the process."); see also id at 1206-09 (noting that this
problem involves more than corporate interest groups; it also involves ideologues
with funding from national sources). But see Ellis, supra note 123, at 54 (discussing
unfunded volunteer amendments that are successful).
128. See Ellis, supra note 123, at 58.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1212-13 (discussing reform efforts).
132. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 416, 428 (1988) (holding that states
cannot criminalize paid signature gathering).
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3. Exasperating the Problem of Abusive Majorities
Another criticism of the initiative is that it
exasperates majoritarian abuses.
This critique is
particularly relevant to the use of the initiative in the
constitutional context.
Contemporary constitutional theory posits that one
function of a constitution is to protect minorities from
majorities who might use democratic institutions in a
discriminatory manner. 133 To do this, constitutions must be
entrenched beyond the realm of ordinary politics and should
be subject to lawmaking processes that protect against
simple aggregation of majoritarian preferences.
If
constitutions are easily amended by a private vote of the
majority, they are more likely to be used as instruments of
discrimination rather than minority protection.1 34
Critics of the initiative process note that the initiative
is particularly vulnerable to majoritarian abuses for at least
three related reasons. First, the initiative bypasses any
meaningful public deliberation regarding constitutional
changes that might affect minorities.135 Public deliberation
by elected officials can foster understanding and tolerance
for the needs and vulnerabilities of minorities and expose
private prejudices that have no place io public law.1 36 To be
sure, representative bodies are capable of discriminatory
action, but transparent public deliberation can sometimes
mitigate animus by making it public and requiring reasoned
justifications.
Second,
the
initiative
process
allows
for
constitutional change by simple aggregation of confidential
citizen preferences. 3 7 An amendment is ratified when a
majority of citizens, acting alone and in private, register their
133. Terrance Sandalow, judicial Protectionof Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162,
1179-80 (1977).
134. This, of course, is a simplification of many deep and complicated issues in
constitutional theory.
135. Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1203.
136. See Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335, 34345 (2009).
137. DINAN, supra note 24, 59-60.

2016]

IMPROVING AMENDMENT

501

support for the amendment.138 This process bypasses many
of the procedural safeguards that protect minorities from
abuses by other democratic institutions. Legislators, for
example, are subject to public transparency for their votes.
They cannot privately vote on explicitly discriminatory
legislation to pursue their own animus without public
exposure.
Additionally, legislators must interact with
constituents and other legislators on a recurring basis. Their
voting track record can impact their relationships with their
constituents and colleagues, and, consequently, can affect
their voting behavior on discriminatory legislation. In a
referendum, on the other hand, proposals are decided
entirely on the confidential preferences of individual
This suggests that the initiative is more
voters.1 39
susceptible to discriminatory uses because voters need not
discuss or even reveal their decision with anyone. Empirical
studies confirm that the initiative is often used to enact
discriminatory measures. 140
Third, referenda votes on initiatives seem to
marginalize minority voters. Empirical studies show that
"[v]oting on ballot propositions only amplifies the social
class bias in participation, because those with lower incomes
or less education tend to skip voting on ballot questions at
much higher rates."141 The referendum also seems to be a
particularly poor method of including minority viewpoints
because the simple aggregation of votes means that minority
voting blocs will be canceled out by majorities without any
formal opportunities for discussion or debate between
majority and minority groups. Consequently, "initiatives are
often decided by a minority of voters whose preferences
frequently differ from state citizens as a whole."1 42

138. Magleby, supra note 80, at 13.
139. Avigail Eisenberg, When (if Ever) Are Referendums on Minority Rights Fair?,
in REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3, 8 (David Laycock ed., 2004).
140. See Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1209-12 (listing examples).
141. See Magleby, supra note 80, at 33-34.
142. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1302.
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IV. WHY INCLUDING COUNTY LEGISLATIVE BODIES
MIGHT IMPROVE THE AMENDMENT PROCESSES
Despite the serious problems with existing
amendment procedures, there has been very little attention
given to creative alternatives. In this Part, I explore whether
including county legislative bodies in the amendment
process could improve the democratic quality of
amendment. I first describe the basic structure of county
government. I then provide a sketch of my proposal for
including county legislative bodies in the initiative process. I
conclude by explaining why my proposal might improve the
democratic quality of the initiative process.
A. The General Structure and Function of County

Governing Bodies
Counties are an intermediate level of government
municipal/city
and
government
state
between
143
With the exceptions of Connecticut, Rhode
government.
Island, and Virginia, every state establishes functioning
county governments that collectively cover the entire state
territory. 144 The primary role of county government is to
provide basic government services to citizens within the
county.1 4 5 Counties are also an important administrative
arm of the state because they bridge the gap between state
policy and local service delivery.1 46 County governments
have also taken on an increasingly important role in the
delivery and administration of federal services.1 47

143. See NAT'L ASS'N OF COUNTIES, COUNTY GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE: A STATE BY
STATE REPORT 6-8 (2009); OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 24-25

(4th ed. 2015).
144. See REYNOLDS, supra note 143.
145. Id. at 25.
146. See NAT'L AsS'N OF COUNTIES, supra note 143, at 6; Tanis J. Salant, County
Governments: An Overview, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE, Winter 1991, at 7
(providing a helpful summary of county government functions).
147. See Linda Lobao & David S. Kraybill, The Emerging Roles of County
Governments in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas: Findings From a National
Survey, 19 ECON. DEV. Q. 245, 246 (2005).
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County governments generally have jurisdiction over
incorporated municipalities within their territories, although
state law often grants incorporated municipalities
independence from counties regarding certain policies and
services. 148 In large metropolitan areas, city governments
will often "consolidate" with county government to create
one body that governs the entire metropolitan area. 149
Despite these jurisdictional complexities, all citizens living
within states other than Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
Virginia have representation in some kind of county
governance, even if only within a consolidated city-county
structure. 1 s0
The structure of county government varies from state
to state, and in a few instances, within a state. 15 ' The most
common structure is the "commission form," which usually
consists of a governing body of between three and five
These bodies often have
elected representatives. 152
executive and legislative authority, and they sometimes
share responsibility for county administration with other
constitutionally protected county officials such as county
clerks, auditors, sheriffs, and treasurers called "row
53
officers."1
Variations in county governance focus mostly on the
structure of executive authority.1 54 Some states, such as
Arkansas and Florida, vest executive authority in a county
administrator, separate from but appointed by the governing
Other counties have separately elected
body.155
148. See REYNOLDS, supra note 143, at 75 (Virginia is only exception to this;
counties have no jurisdiction over territory covered by incorporated areas in
Virginia).
149. See NAT'L ASS'N OF COUNTIES, supra note 143, at 8; see also J. Edwin Benton,
An Assessment of Research on American Counties, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 462, 462 (2005)
(describing research into county consolidation).
150. See REYNOLDS, supra note 143 and accompanying text.
151. See NAT'L AsS'N OF COUNTIES, supra note 143, at 9-20 tbl.lI (summarizing
forms of county governance in all fifty states).
152. See id. at 7.
153. See id.
154. See id. (describing these variations).
155. See id.; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-14-801(a) (Repl. 2013) ("[C]ounty
government, acting through its county quorum court, may exercise local legislative
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executives.1 56 Many states allow counties to alter the
structure of their executive authority or increase the size of
the governing body.157
In addition to administrative responsibility, county
governing bodies have legislative authority whereby they
can debate and adopt county ordinances.158 Some states
allow counties to pass ordinances on any issue not
specifically excluded from county authority by state law.' 59
Other states, such as Colorado, give counties limited,
enumerated powers.160
The process for adopting county ordinances generally
follows the usual process for public lawmaking.161 The
process begins at a public meeting of the governing body
when a representative or citizen initiative introduces an
ordinance for consideration.1 62 Subject to multiple-reading
requirements in some states, the governing body then reads
and publicly debates the proposed ordinance.1 63 The
proposed ordinance may also be subject to committee
review or investigation.1 64 Significantly, all states permit
(and some require) the governing body to allow for public
comment regarding proposed ordinances.1 65 Once the
governing body and the public have discussed the proposed
ordinance, members of the governing body publicly vote on

authority not expressly prohibited by the Arkansas Constitution or by law for the
affairs of the county.").
156. NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNTIES, supra note 143, at 7.
157. See id, at 7-8 (discussing county home-rule authority).
158. See generally id. at 9-20 (describing legislative authority of counties in all
fifty states).
159. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-14-801(a) ("[C]ounty government, acting
through its county quorum court, may exercise local legislative authority not
expressly prohibited by the Arkansas Constitution or by law for the affairs of the
county.").
160. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-101 (West 2016).
161. See, e.g., TONY E. WINDHAM, UNIV. OF ARK. DIV. OF AGRIC., PROCEDURAL GUIDE
FOR ARKANSAS COUNTY QUORUM COURT MEETINGS 12-14 (rev. ed. 2006) (describing
Arkansas's procedures).
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id. at 13-14.
164. Id. at 17-18.
165. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-17-207(b)(1)-(2) (Repl. 2013).
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the ordinance, and a majority vote is usually sufficient for
the ordinance to pass. 166
Significant for present purposes, all sixteen states
that allow for constitutional amendment by citizen initiative
have functioning county governing bodies with at least some
legislative authority.1 67
B. An Overview of the County-Ratification Model
States with the citizen initiative already in place could
perhaps improve the democratic quality of their amendment
processes by requiring a majority (or a proportionally
weighted majority)1 68 of the state's county governing bodies
to approve all citizen-initiated amendments rather than
submitting those amendments to a statewide referendum.
To focus my analysis and qualify my arguments, it is
helpful to identify the key features of my proposal. First, it
would not affect the legislative-referral method of
amendment. My suggestion is limited to only the citizeninitiative method in the sixteen states that allow for
amendment by both legislative referral and citizen
initiative.1 69 This is because, as others have noted, allowing
amendments to be initiated by either the legislature or
directly by citizens provides a useful check on abuse of the
amendment power.1 70 There are, however, serious flaws in
the citizen-initiative process that must be addressed in order
to improve state amendment procedures. Thus, reform to
the initiative process is the most appropriate inquiry.
Second, my proposal does not offer any reforms to
the signature-gathering phase of the citizen initiative. This is
not to suggest that reform in that area is unwarranted, but
166.

HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER 339 (rev. 1970).

167. See NAT'LAsS'N OF COUNTIES, supra note 143, at 28-64.
168. As discussed in more detail below, the ratification threshold might be
adjusted to address Equal Protection concerns related to voter equality. See infra
Section V.A.
169. See supra note 15 (listing states included in my study).
170. See Benjamin, supra note 84. The county-ratification model could be
applied to ratification of legislatively referred amendments, but I focus only on the
citizen-initiative process to narrow my analysis.

506

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:477

my focus here is on the ratification portion of the citizen
initiative because it has received very little scholarly
attention. Under my county-ratification model, citizens
would initiate amendments in the same manner as currently
permitted in initiative states. In most states, this requires
obtaining a specified number of signatures in support of the
proposal, and then submitting the text of the proposed
amendment and proof of signatures to the state attorney
general for certification.1 71 After the attorney general
certifies a citizen initiative, he or she would then send the
proposed amendment to all county governing bodies for
consideration. The attorney general would likely need to set
a deadline for counties to return an "up-or-down" response
to the proposed amendment, but the attorney general would
not otherwise interfere with counties' procedures for
deciding on the amendment.
Third, once the attorney general certifies citizen
initiatives, county governing bodies would review them in a
manner very similar to how they review ordinances. The
proposed amendment would be placed on the agenda for a
public meeting of the governing body. The body members
would discuss the amendment, solicit citizen feedback, and
could even refer the amendment to a committee for further
investigation. After the governing body's deliberations, it
would publically vote on whether to approve or reject the
Each county would report its collective
amendment.
decision back to the attorney general, who would determine
whether the required number of counties approved the
amendment.
Obviously, this is a very general sketch of how a
county-ratification model might work. Deploying a model
like this for any particular state would require consideration
of myriad other important design issues.1 72 However, it
provides a sufficient framework to begin an assessment of

171. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-9-107 (Supp. 2015).
172. See infra Section V.E (discussing "implementation complexity" as a counter
argument to the county-ratification model).
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process might improve the

C. How a County-Ratification Model Might Improve the
Democratic Quality of State Amendment Processes
This Section provides a preliminary analysis of how a
county-ratification model might improve the democratic
quality of state amendment processes. To do this, I draw on
existing theoretical and empirical scholarship regarding
decentralization and democratic theory to explore how the
model might affect amendment decision making in my
sixteen-state sample. I advance three arguments in this
regard: (1) channeling amendment debates into county
governing bodies might improve citizen participation in
amendment politics; (2) channeling amendment debates
into county governing bodies might improve the quality of
public deliberation; and (3) dividing the amendment power
between county governing bodies rather than consolidating
it in the legislature or a statewide referendum might reduce
special-interest influence in amendment politics and more
effectively empower "the people." 1 7 3

1. Improved Citizen Involvement in Amendment Decisions
As noted above, citizens are increasingly alienated
from the initiative process by well-financed special interest
groups that pay top dollar to signature-gathering firms and
run
expensive
statewide
advertising
campaigns.
Additionally, many citizen voters learn about the proposal
only days before the vote, consult only one source of
information regarding the initiative, and very rarely discuss
the initiative with anyone. 174 This represents a very thin,
173. My theoretical approach to citizen participation in amendment practice
generally follows the model of localism and political participation set out by Gerald E.
Frug in The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068-70 (1980). See
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartII-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 393-95 (1990) (describing Frug's argument regarding the democratic virtues of
localism).
174. See Gais & Benjamin, supra note 1, at 1301.

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

508

[Vol. 69:477

suboptimal level of political involvement by citizens. The
county-ratification model might help improve citizen
involvement in amendment politics by reducing democratic
scale to provide real opportunities for citizen engagement.
It is a truism in democratic theory that citizen
participation tends to increase as jurisdiction size
decreases.17 5 All things being equal, citizens are more likely
to engage with small, local democratic institutions because
the costs of participation are lower and the likelihood of
As a result, local
affecting the outcome is greater.
democracies tend to be more responsive and accountable to
their constituents' preferences than larger democracies.' 76
The empirical research testing these premises is vast
and somewhat contested.1 77 However, a few important
themes have surfaced. First, as jurisdiction size decreases,
the primary effect on citizen participation seems to be an
increase in the quality of citizen participation.1 78 For
example, voter turnout for local elections is notoriously
low,1 79 but citizen involvement in "thick" forms of political

'

participation-such as contacting officials, attending
hearings, and even running for public office-is remarkably
high. 80 In smaller jurisdictions, citizens are much more
likely to personally engage in these forms of political
participation.' 8

175. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 207 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O'Connell eds., 2010); Frug, supra note 173, at 1069. This intuition was at the heart of
Jefferson's Ward Republic. See Michael Hardt,Jeffersonand Democracy, 59 AM. Q. 41,
69-72 (2007).
176.

See

J.

ERIC OLIVER, LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF SMALL-SCALE

DEMOCRACY 16 (2012) ("[G]overnmental accountability and access is lower in a large
democracy than a small one.").
177. See generally David Karlsson, A Democracy of Scale, Size and Representative
Democracy in Swedish Local Government, 17 SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 7 (2013)
(summarizing scale literature).
178. See Hills, supra note 175.
179. See OLIVER, supra note 176, at 55 (stating voter turnout in most local
elections is below twenty-five percent).
180. See Hills, supra note 175.
181. See OLIVER, supra note 176, at 55-56; Hills, supra note 175.
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Identifying the population "tipping point" for "thick"
forms of citizen participation is complicated and involves
many variables. 182 Empiricists have nevertheless identified
some benchmarks. Eric Oliver's 2001 seminal study found
that thick citizen participation is highest in jurisdictions of
5000 or less, but also found that thick citizen participation
remains meaningful in jurisdictions between 50,000 to
250,000 and even in jurisdictions between 250,000 to one
million. 183 In local jurisdictions of more than one million,
thick citizen participation is less likely.1 84
Oliver's benchmarks are.interesting when compared
to county and state populations across the sixteen states that
have the citizen initiative.185 Table 1 below shows the
number of counties in each state that fall within Oliver's
population benchmarks, as well as the overall state
population for each state.1 86

182. See Karlsson, supra note 177, at 8-10.
183. See OLIVER, supra note 95, at 42-45 (quantifying "nonelectoral civic
participation" in jurisdictions of varying sizes); see also ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R.
TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 63-64 (1973) (discussing voter participation in Swedish
communes).
184. See OLIVER, supra note 95, at 47.
185. There are significant limitations on this comparison. Oliver primarily
studied municipalities and other incorporated local governments that covered less
territory and were perhaps more visible to citizens.
Nevertheless, Oliver's
benchmarks provide a helpful starting point in assessing the virtues of a countyratification model.
186. I compiled this table from the Census Bureau's 2014 population
projections, which are based on the 2010 Census data. See Estimates of Resident
Population Change ForCounties and County Rankings: July 1, 2013 to July 1, 2014, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, [hereinafter 2014 Population Projections], https://www.census.go
v/popest/data/counties/totals/2014/CO-EST2014-03.html [https://perma.cc/B3PEVCCT] (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
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Table 1
Number of Counties with Populations
Between:

State

State
Population

05,000

5,000 50,000

50,000 - 250,000
- 1 mil.
250,000

Over
1

mil.

AZ
AR
CA
CO
FL
MI
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
ND
OH
OK
OR
SD

6,731,484
2,966,369
38,802,500
5,355,866
19,893,297
9,909,877
2,994,079
6,063,589
1,023,579
1,881,503
2,839,099
739,482
11,594,163
3,878,051
3,970,239
853,175

0
0
2
14
0
1
2
7
21
37
4
29
0
7
3
30

4
62
13
35
26
47
66
86
29
52
8
20
39
56
17
33

8
12
17
6
18
26
14
17
6
2
3
4
40
11
11
3

1
1
17
9
18
7
0
4
0
2
1
0
7
3
5
0

2
0
9
0
5
2
0
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
0

Looking only at jurisdiction size, county populations

across these states seem to fit nicely within the preferred
sizes for thick citizen participation.1 37 State populations, on
the other hand, seem much less likely to foster thick
Indeed, every state has a majority of its
participation.
county populations under one million people, but only North
and South Dakota have a statewide population under one
million people.18 8

187. Another factor that affects citizen participation is the significance of the
issues at stake. Marshfield, supra note 95, at 1189. The greater the significance of the
issue, the more likely citizens are to get involved in the decision-making process. Id.
This variable also suggests that a county-ratification model might facilitate better
citizen participation because it would put constitutional issues in the hands of local
governing bodies.
188. See 2014 Population Projections, supra note 186 (follow "North Dakota"
hyperlink); id. (follow "South Dakota" hyperlink).
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Counties therefore
seem to be preferable
jurisdictions within which to foster more direct and
meaningful citizen participation. If amendment decisions
were put on the agenda for resolution by county governing
bodies, it seems that citizens would be more willing and able
to engage the process in meaningful ways, such as by
attending hearings, contacting local representatives, and
even running for county office themselves. All of these forms
of participation become realistic (and even more likely)
when amendment decisions are moved from a statewide
referendum to local jurisdictions.
There are, of course, some extraordinarily large
counties. Los Angeles County, for example, is the largest in
the country with more than ten million residents,
comprising approximately twenty-six percent of California's
overall population.189 Sending amendment decisions to Los
Angeles County might not enhance citizen participation
within the county because of its large size. However,
California has thirty-two other counties with populations
below 250,000 people. 190 Citizens in those counties are
likely to engage with amendment decisions in more
meaningful ways than in a statewide referendum, which may
make a county-ratification model valuable nonetheless.
2. Improved Public Deliberation Regarding Amendment

Decisions
In addition to "thickening" citizen participation, a
county-ratification model might also strengthen the
deliberative quality of amendment decisions. As noted
above, one of the major problems with the citizen initiative
is that it circumvents meaningful deliberation regarding
constitutional changes, and can even enable collective
prejudices by allowing amendment decisions to be decided
in the secrecy of the ballot booth.

189. See id. (follow "California" hyperlink).
190. Id.
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These problems might be mitigated by requiring
county governing bodies to debate and transparently vote
on proposed amendments. The county-ratification model
envisions a county governing body voting on proposed
amendments pursuant to similar processes and procedures
for adopting county ordinances in many states. The process
usually includes review by body members, reasonable
opportunities for committee investigations and reports, and
a public hearing. The process would culminate with a
transparent vote by locally elected representatives on
whether to ratify or reject proposed amendments. This
process is dramatically different than the current initiativeratification process because it would subject amendment
decisions to public review and discussion by locally
accountable representatives. There are at least two likely
benefits to this more deliberate and transparent ratification
process.
First, it can help mitigate majoritarian abuses.
Allowing amendments to be ratified by aggregating secret
individual preferences seems to invite expressions of
prejudice. However, when discriminatory viewpoints are
subject to public exposure and discussion, they are more
likely to be moderated, vetted, and even rejected.
Representative decision making is especially effective at
mitigating majoritarian abuses when minority viewpoints
have at least some voice in the process. To be sure,
discrimination can occur even in representative decisionmaking bodies-especially in homogenous bodies where
minority viewpoints are not expressed or taken seriouslybut representative decision making seems a vast
improvement on the aggregation of secret private
preferences.
Regarding minority viewpoint representation,
counties have the promise of being effective political
subdivisions for giving voice to minority viewpoints in the
amendment process. Using race as a proxy for diversity, the
chart below shows the number of counties with populations
that are more racially diverse than the state's population as a
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As these data show, every state has several counties
with greater minority representation than in the state
population as a whole, and every state except Ohio and
Oregon have at least one majority-minority county. This is
significant for deliberative purposes because it means that
unlike a statewide referendum where minority viewpoints
are likely washed out by simple aggregation of private votes,
a county-ratification model would give minority viewpoints
a formal, public structure for voicing opinions regarding
191. 1 compiled this chart from Census Bureau Data on racial diversity from the
2010 census. In classifying minority and majority populations, I followed the
definitions and classifications used by the Census Bureau. See LINDSAY HIXSON ET AL.,
U.S.

CENsus

BUREAU,

THE

WHITE

POPULATION:

2010,

at

16-17

(2011),

[https://perma.cc/D
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2OlObr-05.pdf
WB4-UYRT] (the minority population includes "people who reported their race and
ethnicity as something other than non-Hispanic White alone").
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proposed amendments. 192 Minority representatives on
county governing bodies will have an opportunity to express
minority viewpoints during the body's deliberations.
Additionally, governing bodies in majority-minority counties
will have an opportunity to publically decide on proposed
amendments from a minority viewpoint and provide
justifications for their decisions that other governing bodies
may then consider. A transparent public forum that gives
voice to minority communities can facilitate accountability
between counties, promote inclusive deliberation, and help
mitigate majoritarian abuses.
In addition to mitigating majoritarian abuses, a
county-ratification model might improve the accuracy and
dissemination of information regarding an amendment
proposal. One of the primary benefits of representative
decision making is that it provides a public forum for the
exchange and vetting of viewpoints on a proposal. As
citizens and representatives discuss a proposal, collective
knowledge regarding the proposal presumably grows and
the overall quality of the decision-making process
consequently improves. A county-ratification model can
facilitate this process by giving citizens a forum at public
hearings to express viewpoints on proposed amendments
and by forcing representatives to discuss amendments with
each other and the public. 193
In sum, ratifying amendments by public referendum
seems to result in under-inclusive and limited deliberation.
A county-ratification model might improve the process by

192. Empiricists have found that diversity tends to decrease as jurisdiction size
decreases. See OLIVER, supra note 176, at 17 (charting racial diversity but noting that
"[t]he same trend occurs with nearly every other social category").
193. County governments appear to have a strong tradition of gathering
information regarding public opinion before making decisions. See Maureen Berner,
Citizen Participationin Local Government Budgeting, POPULAR GOv'T, Spring 2001, at
23-24 (discussing North Carolina public budget hearings). A 2001 study of citizen
participation in county budging approval found that counties use a variety of different
methods to solicit citizen feedback, such as informal "[c]offeehouse conversations",
"[v]isits to local civic groups", and the formation of "[c]itizen advisory boards." Id. at
27 tbl.6.
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providing a voice for minority viewpoints and facilitating
more robust discussion regarding proposed amendments.

3. Reduced Special Interest Influence in Amendment
Decisions
As noted above, a major problem with the initiative
process is the influence of well-financed special interests. 194
These groups have undermined the initiative as a grassroots,
populist institution. Instead, the initiative often involves
reforms with limited popular support, but with significant
financial backing from corporate or ideological interest
groups.
A county-ratification model might help reduce special
interest influence and restore the initiative to its popular
sovereignty roots. From a democratic theory perspective,
this might seem counter-intuitive.
The traditional
Madisonian assumption is that lower levels of government
are more susceptible to capture by special interests because
of, among other things, greater cohesiveness of interest
groups and smaller population sizes.195
However, this assumption has come under criticism
by recent theoretical investigation.1 96 The susceptibility to
capture of low-level governing institutions depends on a
variety of variables such as the relative extent of political
competition and differences in electoral systems.1 97 It is not
clear, therefore, that county governments are always more
prone to capture than state institutions. 198 The "relative

194. Hoesly, supra note 2, at 1202-03.
195. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 100; see also Pranab Bardhan & Dilip
Mookherjee, Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels, 90 AM. ECON. REV.
135, 135, 139 (2000) (describing the Madisonian view).
196. See Bardhan & Mookherjee, supra note 195, at 135 (explaining that
"[d]espite the importance of this issue, not much systematic research appears to have
been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local
governments to interest-group capture").
197. Id. at 139 ("[T]he relative proneness to capture of local governments
depends on a multitude of diverse factors.").
198. Id.
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capture at the local level may . . be context- and systemspecific." 99
More importantly, however, the county-ratification
model would not centralize the amendment power in the
hands of one particular county governing body that could be
easily captured. Instead, it would divide the amendment
power between the various counties within a state. My
hypothesis is that this design arguably involves a more
effective check on capture and abuse than centralizing the
amendment power in a statewide referendum. 200 It is based
on Madison's checks-and-balances argument in Federalist
No. 51, where Madison argued that the tyranny of the
majority can be managed by dividing society "into so many
parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of
individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from
interested combinations of the majority." 20 1
Statewide
referenda
represent an
absolute
consolidation of the amendment power with a majority of
voters who will decide the issue in secret and without any
deliberation. Referenda are therefore relatively easy to
capture through mechanisms such as mass media. 202 A
county-ratification model, on the other hand, divides the
amendment power between myriad multi-member county
governing bodies. This division and separation of power
within the amendment process could help protect against
capture and majoritarian abuses in several ways.
First, it would seem much more difficult to capture a
majority of the county governing bodies in a state than to
aggregate public opinion.203 Voter decision making on
199. Id.
200. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Decentralizing the Amendment Power, 19 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 963 (2016) (making the same suggestion regarding decentralization of
national amendment processes to include subnational units such as states).
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 121 (James Madison) (Michael A. Genovese ed.,
2009).
202. See OLIVER, supra note 176, at 20-21 (discussing the role of media in large
jurisdictional politics).
203. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologiesand Civic Republican Values,
71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1991) ("One may posit that it is more difficult to capture fifty
state legislatures and bureaucracies than to master one in Washington.").
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statewide referenda is generally simplistic and ideological,
which means that interest groups can impact referenda
outcomes by running mass media campaigns that play on
simplistic ideological associations. Decision making and
accountability regarding local governing bodies are
considerably
more
personal,
deliberative,
and
204
transparent.
Under a county-ratification model, local
representatives would have a personal interest in
amendment decisions because they would be openly
accountable to constituents for their vote.205 This suggests
that they would have greater personal incentives to study
and discuss proposed amendments than citizens voting in a
referenda, which could create a check on capture and an
incentive for reducing agency costs.
Second, a county-ratification model would create a
competitive environment between counties, which could
help limit capture. By giving each county a role in the
amendment process, counties have an incentive to monitor
each other.
Capturing the process would require
overcoming a complicated coordination problem.
One
"captured" county would likely be exposed by the other
counties as acting under the disproportionate influence of
special interests. To capture the process as a whole, special
interests would therefore have to obtain a degree of
coordination between counties. This would likely make
capture more difficult than in a statewide referenda.
Third, a county-ratification model has the promise of
restoring a degree of popular sovereignty to the amendment
process.
Although the referenda was intended as a
mechanism for restoring popular sovereignty, 206 its
susceptibility to capture has significantly undermined its
popular legitimacy. Local democratic institutions, on the
other hand, are generally considered to be very responsive
204. See OLIVER, supra note 176, at 20-21 (discussing how political activism and
accountability in smaller jurisdictions is often less mediated, more personal, and less
ideological).
205. See id.
206. Magleby, supra note 80, at 13-15.

518

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:477

This is because
and accountable to constituents. 20 7
representatives are "closer" to constituents in small
democracies, which means that political life tends to be
more interpersonal and less mediated through devices like
media and political parties. 208 To the extent county
representatives are more accessible and responsive to local
communities in any given state, delegating the amendment
authority to county governing bodies might be an effective
means of taking the amendment power back from special
interests that control the referendum and restoring it to the
people.
V. PROBLEMS WITH INCLUDING COUNTY
LEGISLATIVE BODIES IN STATE AMENDMENT

PROCESSES
The county-ratification model will not solve all
problems related to state constitutional amendment process.
In fact, it surely comes with its own costs. In this Part, I
identify some of the major problems and likely counterarguments to a county-ratification model.
A. Equal Protection
A significant issue with a county-ratification model is
compliance with the one-person, one-vote principle under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 209
The Fourteenth Amendment requires equality in the
population of legislative districts so that an individual's vote
in one district does not count substantially less than an
individual's vote in another district.210 The Supreme Court
has applied this principle to state and local elections, but

207. See OLIVER, supra note 176, at 17-18; Karlsson, supra note 177, at 8-9;
Russel M. Lazega & Charles R. Fletcher, The Politics of MunicipalIncorporationin South
Florida, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 215, 225 (1997).
208. See OLIVER, supra note 176, at 17-18.
209. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962); REYNOLDS, supra note 143,
at 67-75 (discussing one-person, one-vote in relation to local government).
210. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
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never directly to state constitutional amendment
procedures. 211
The few lower courts that have addressed the issue
have held that there is "no rational basis to distinguish
between voting on representatives in the legislature, and
voting on constitutional amendments." 212 Thus, although
not definitively decided by the Supreme Court, the dominant
position is that amendment ratification must comply with
the one-person, one-vote requirement. 213
Assuming that the one-person, one-vote requirement
would apply to the county-ratification model, 214 the model
raises some equality concerns that would likely need to be
addressed. Although county representatives must already
be elected consistent with the one-person, one-vote
requirement within each county,2 1 5 the county-ratification

model would decide a statewide proposal by adding up the
number of counties that approve the proposal. If there is
great disparity in populations between counties (which is
usually true), there could be significant underrepresentation for voters in populous counties and overrepresentation for voters in desolate counties.
Arizona provides a helpful example. Arizona is
divided into fifteen counties, but sixty-one percent of the
overall population lives in one county (Maricopa County). 216
The smallest county, Greenlee County, contains an estimated

211. See Peter Suber, Population Changes and Constitutional Amendments:
Versus Democracy, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 409, 420 n.19 (1987).
212. See, e.g., State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 150, 155
(N.M. 1968) (holding that New Mexico's amendment rules violated Equal Protection
because they required amendments to be ratified by majorities in a majority of
counties).
213. See West v. Carr, 370 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. 1963) (discussing the one-person,
one-vote principle in the context of a constitutional convention process).
214. There are perhaps arguments that conventional Equal Protection
principles should not apply to a county-ratification model, but I leave those
arguments for another time.
215. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
216. Annual Estimates of the Resident Populationfor Counties: April 1, 2010 to
July 1, 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties
/totals/2015/CO-EST2015-01.html [https://perma.cc/BZ74-YPVC] (follow "Arizona"
hyperlink).
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9529 people, or approximately 0.14% of the overall state
population. 217 Clearly, giving each county an equal say in the
ratification process under those circumstances would result
in significant inequalities for voters.
The equality problem could possibly be addressed by
giving each county a weighted vote in the ratification
decision that is proportional to its share of the overall state
population. 218 However, this could affect the dynamics of
the model. In Arizona, for example, a weighted-majority rule
that required only a simple majority of the population to
approve an amendment would mean that the governing
body for Maricopa County would control the outcome for the
whole state.2 19 To ensure that all counties have some
representation in the process, Arizona would likely need to
adopt a super-majority requirement that would necessarily
include other counties in the process and preserve many of
the procedural virtues of the county-ratification model. 220
It is not possible to fully analyze the Equal Protection
issue here. This is a complex issue that deserves more
attention if the county-ratification model is considered for
any particular state. My purpose is only to raise the issue
and its potential effects on the lawful design of the countyratification model.
B. Mismatched Expertise and Limited Resources
An important objection to the county-ratification
model is that county representatives are not well suited to
County
issues.
statewide
important
deciding
their
on
based
elected
usually
representatives are
managerial capacity or performance, and not their
ideological viewpoints or statesmanship. 221 This is because
217. Id. (providing estimated 2015 Arizona county populations); id. (follow "All
States" hyperlink) (providing total estimated 2015 state populations).
218. Another solution might be to make county ratification "advisory," followed
by a binding public referendum. Thanks to Justin Long for suggesting this.
219. See supra text accompanying note 216.
220. The Supreme Court has upheld super-majority requirements. See, e.g.,
Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1971).
221. OLIVER, supra note 176, at 6-7.
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the primary business of county government relates to the
provision of basic government services rather than the
resolution of ideological conflicts. 222 County governing
bodies also lack the breadth of perspective on state
government that a state legislature might possess. 223 This
might make county governing bodies a poor forum for
debating constitutional amendments, which often touch on
broad ideological issues that have myriad complex
implications for a state and its government. 224 Additionally,
county governments are notoriously under-resourced. 225
Adding controversial amendment decisions to the county
agenda could further exhaust county government and
detract from the effective provision of local services.
This critique raises important considerations
regarding the county-ratification model. However, it is easy
to overstate these concerns and lose sight of the current
state of amendment practice in initiative states. The countyratification model is not a perfect system for deciding
amendment issues. There are surely limitations and costs
for enlisting county governing bodies in the amendment
process, but those costs must be compared to the existing
process and weighed against possible improvements to that
process.
For example, although county representatives might
be less qualified to debate many amendment issues than
state representatives, they are perhaps better situated than
citizens voting in private, based on thin sources of
information.
County representatives are increasingly
sophisticated administrators because of the increasing role
of county government. 226 Counties manage large budgets,
adopt and implement complicated economic development
222. Id.
223. Seeid.
224. See id. at 10 (stating that local government is not an ideal venue for
resolving deep social and economic issues).
225. See Salant, supra note 146, at 9; Lobao & Kraybill, supra note 147, at 25354.
226. See Lobao & Kraybill, supra note 147 (explaining that county officials have
significant responsibilities).
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policies, administer federal and state assistance programs,
coordinate regional planning, and act as intermediaries
between citizens, municipalities, state government, and
federal agencies. 227
Thus, county representatives are
becoming increasingly skilled at public administration and
likely have the ability to engage in a constructive public
debate regarding many amendment issues.
The point regarding county resources might also be
overstated. Over the last decade, initiative states have
averaged about 1.5 proposed amendments by initiative
every two years. 228 If California is removed from that
sample, initiative states have averaged only one amendment
every two years. 229 This means that, on average, counties
would have had to consider only one amendment every two
years.230 Although a county-ratification model will surely
detract some county resources from other activities, this
does not seem like a significant imposition on counties.
C. The People Rarely Give Up the Initiative
A further criticism of the county-ratification model is
that it is the equivalent of a constitutional "pipe dream"
because states very rarely dispose of the initiative despite a
tradition of redesigning amendment procedures. 231
It is true that it is politically very difficult for states to
eliminate the initiative. Once citizens have the right to
amend their constitutions directly, they are very reluctant to
give that up.2 3 2 However, as John Dinan has noted, the
twenty-first century is characterized by a trend in
amendment design towards limiting the initiative process. 233
227. See id.
228. See supra note 75 and accompanying chart
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dual Path Initiative
Framework, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 299, 310 (2007) ("Although one response to the
problems in the initiative process is to eliminate direct democracy, we do not
advocate that path.... [W]e do not believe it is realistic.").
232. Id.
233. John Dinan, Twenty-First Century Debates and Developments Regarding the
Design of State Amendment Processes,69 ARK. L. REV. 283, 292 (2016).
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Thus, it is possible that "tides" are changing and state
constitutional designers would be more receptive to an
amendment process that significantly reforms the initiative.
Additionally, the county-ratification model has the
benefit of retaining a grassroots form of constitutional
ratification. Thus, voters might be more inclined to consider
it even if they would reject proposals to categorically
eliminate the initiative. In light of the real problems in
current initiative practice, the county-ratification model
deserves consideration and discussion.
D. Making the Constitution Too Hard to Amend
Another objection to the county-ratification model is
that it would make state constitutions practically impossible
to amend through the initiative process.
Because
amendments would be subject to debate and approval in
county governing bodies across the state, there is reason to
believe that amendment processes might become very
protracted and difficult to navigate. Practically, this might
mean that state constitutions would become too stagnant
and outdated or that the legislature's power in the
amendment process would grow too great and unchecked.
This criticism raises important concerns, but there
are countervailing considerations. First, it assumes that the
constitutional flexibility provided by current initiative
practice is normatively desirable. There are, however, many
who argue that the special-interest-driven flexibility of the
initiative process is dysfunctional, and that greater stability
is required. In that case, the county-ratification model might
be desirable to amendment reformers. 234
It is also hard to predict what effect the countyratification model will have on constitutional flexibility. The
model would likely make amendment by initiative more
difficult than a referendum model, but there is no reason to
believe that it would make the initiative unusable. I recently
234. Again, this seems to be the trend in contemporary debates by
constitutional designers about how to reform the initiative process. See id.
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concluded a study of decentralization in national
constitutional amendment rules and found countries that
require subnational units to participate in amendment
processes often do not experience lower overall amendment
rates. 235
Constitutional flexibility is a very important
consideration in designing amendment rules. A countyratification model would likely make amendment by
initiative more difficult than a referendum model, but this
may be a desirable outcome or an acceptable cost for some
states in reforming their amendment procedures.
E. Implementation Complexity
Finally, the county-ratification model would be
relatively complex to implement in any given state. It would
require constitutional amendments and probably legislation
on a variety of ancillary issues. Constitutional amendments
might have to change provisions besides the amendment
rules. The legislative article under California's constitution,
for example, would likely have to be amended because it
states that "the people reserve to themselves the powers of
initiative and referendum." 23 6 This sort of constitutional
"house cleaning" can be complex when significant structural
changes are made.
Additionally, many states would have to change local
government legislation to accommodate the countyratification model. States that allow county executives to
veto county ordinances and resolutions might want to
eliminate that veto authority for amendment decisions. 237
There are likely many other legal complexities. In Arkansas,
for example, the legislature would likely need to consider
whether to change the County Government Code so that

235. See Marshfield, supra note 200.
236. See CAL. CONST. art IV, § 1.
237. See WINDHAM, supra note 161, at 15-16 (discussing executive veto
authority in Arkansas county governance).
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amendment decisions are not subject to county referenda
like ordinary county ordinances. 23 8
There is no denying that the legal aspects of adopting
the county-ratification model are complex. Any jurisdiction
considering the model would have to weigh whether the
implementation complexity outweighs the other likely
benefits. My purpose here is only to acknowledge the legal
complexity associated with my proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
State constitutional amendments contribute greatly
to constitutional life in the United States. As of January 1,
2015, voters have considered 11,369 amendments to
currently operative state constitutions. 239 Voters ratified
7481 of those amendments. 240 This represents a significant
corpus of positive constitutional law created through state
amendment processes.
It is important, therefore, that
scholars give more attention to understanding how these
processes are functioning and can be improved. My goal in
this essay is to encourage creative thinking regarding the
design of state amendment processes, and also suggest that
a county-ratification model of some kind might be an
improvement on the citizen-initiative process.

238. See WINDHAM, supra note 161, at 13 (describing the rules for local
referenda in Arkansas).
239. See Dinan, supra note 2, at 11 tbl.1.1. Delaware's 145 amendments are
included in this number even though they were not submitted to the voters directly.
240. See id.
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